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ARTICLE

Tender Offers in the European
Community: The Playing Field Shrinks
Jeffrey P. Greenbaum*
ABSTRACT

This Article discusses the Proposal in the European Community to
standardize the tender offer process in the Single European Market of
1992. The Proposalpromotes equal treatment of shareholdersand contains substantive measures to achieve this goal. Mr. Greenbaum compares the Proposal to its United States counterpart, the 1968 Williams
Act, notes the different approach taken by the Williams Act, with its emphasis on disclosure rather than substantive regulation, and examines
these different approachesprimarily in the context of hostile tender offers.
Mr. Greenbaum shows that the Proposal's procedural requirementsfor
the bidder and restrictions on target management defenses leave both
with a smaller tender offer playingfield within which to maneuver. In
addition, Mr. Greenbaum suggests that the Proposal may not be able to
provide the type of shareholder protection it envisions unless there is
stringent Community control of Member State anti-takeover regulation.
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INTRODUCTION

Securities Markets in the Single Europe

As 1992 and the near-mythic goal of a single European market approaches, the European Community (the Community) has moved toward
achieving market integration by promulgating numerous regulations that
remove many physical, technical, and fiscal barriers among its Member
States. The basis for these regulations is the European Community
White Paper of 1985,1 which fixed December 31, 1992,2 as the deadline
for creating a "Europe without frontiers."' As part of the continuing
development of the single market, the securities markets of the Community are also evolving toward more uniform regulation.4 One facet of this
transition is the recent Proposalfor a Thirteenth Council Directive on
Company Law Concerning Takeover and Other General Bids (the

1.

COMMISSION OF THE EUR. COMM., COMPLETING THE INTERNAL MARKET,

COM(85) 310 final (June 14, 1985). The Single European Act, of February 17, 1986,
30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 169) 1 (1987) [hereinafter Single European Act], contained
the first major amendments to the treaty establishing the Community. The Treaty of
Rome Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1967, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome]. It also provided a stronger base for effecting
these changes. For a recent publication on the Single European Act, see Schildhaus,
1992 and the Single European Act, 23 Int'l Law. 549 (1989).
2. Although December 31, 1992, is the stated deadline for integration, this ongoing
process will indeed continue into the future. For a summary of the Community's progress toward achieving the Single Market, see, COMMISSION OF THE EUR. COMM.,
FOURTH REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PAR-

LIAMENT, CoM (89) 311 final (June 20, 1989).

CoMM, EUROPE WITHOUT
(1988).
4. As of November 1, 1989, the Proposal, infra note 5, is still before the European
Parliament for its first reading but has not yet been put on the agenda. It has been
referred to the Legal Affairs Committee, of which Mrs. Nicole Fontainer is rapporteur.
Under the amendment to the article 149 of the Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, by the
Single European Act, it is likely that the Proposal will have to be presented twice to the
Parliament before the European Council will approve the final version of the Proposal.
Single European Act, supra note 1, at 5.
3.

See, e.g., OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBL. OF THE EUR.

FRONTIERS-COMPLETING THE INTERNAL MARKET
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Proposal).'
The purpose of the Proposal is to harmonize the law of the Member
States' with respect to takeovers and to "afford shareholders and other
interested parties equivalent standards of protection" throughout the
Community.7 The Proposal would provide the European equivalent to
the Williams Acte regulation of tender offers in the United States.' This
area will become increasingly important to United States companies,
whether they seek to enter the Community before "Fortress Europe"
raises its drawbridge (by erecting barriers against outside competition) 10
or wish merely to take greater advantage of the strengthened European

5. 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 64) 8 (1989) [hereinafter Proposal]. The text of the
Proposal is attached as an Appendix to this Article.
6. The present laws of the Member States are quite disparate concerning their encouragement or discouragement of tender offers. See, MacLachlan & MacKesy, Acquisitions of Companies in Europe-Practicability,Disclosure, and Regulation: An Overview, 23 INT'L LAW. 373 (1989). By far, the United Kingdom has been the site of the
greatest number of hostile tender offers in the Community. For example, in 1986, 195
such offers occurred in the United Kingdom, 12 in France, 10 in Spain, and 8 in
Belgium. Tender offer activity, however, is expected to increase in the other Member
States. See 1459 Eur. Rep., Dec. 24, 1988, at 4. Thus, the Proposal would regulate
acquisitions in countries whose business cultures have not before promoted hostile acquisitions and whose existing company practices, such as cross ownership of stock, might
provide additional barriers.
7. See EEC COMMISSION, EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM COM(88) 823 final-SYN
186, at 2 (Feb. 16, 1989) [hereinafter EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM]. Note that the
Proposal is not directed toward asset mergers. Id.
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78 m(d)-(e), n(d)-(f) (1988). The Williams Act was a 1968 amendment to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 409, 48 Stat. 881, made in response
to the great increase in the use of the cash tender offer.
9. The Williams Act, however, applies at a slightly lower threshold than does the
Proposal. Unless a company has 500 or more record shareholders and total assets of $5
million, it is free from the disclosure requirements of the Williams Act. 17 C.F.R. §
240.12g-1 (1988). The Proposal covers takeover bids for companies having assets of more
than ECU 6.2 million, total sales of more than ECU 12.8 million, and a yearly average
of more than 250 employees. (This corresponds to $7.0 million and $14.5 million according to the ECU-dollar conversion rate quoted in Wall Street J., Nov. 27, 1989, § C, at
10, col. 4). See Proposal, supra note 5, art. 5(b), at 10; Fourth Council Directive of 25
July 1978, (781660/EEC), 21 0. J. EUR. COMM. (No. L. 222) 11, 21 (1978),
amended by Council Directive of 27 Nov. 1989 (84/569), 27 O.J. EUR. CoMM. (No. L
314) 28 (1984).
10. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 290, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1988) (report submitted
by Sen. Rostenkowski on Oct. 17, 1988, denouncing the restrictive Community broadcasting directive); Impregnable FortressBrussels, J. Com., July 17, 1989, § A, at 8, col.
3; The Growing Fear of Fortress Europe, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1988, § 3, at 1, col. 1;
Resistance Grows to European Community Plan to End Trade Barriers,J. Com., Oct.
25, 1988, § A, at 1, col. 2.
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market" and the "cornucopia of undervalued corporations" existing in
Europe. 2 In either case, the European regulation of tender offers will
figure prominently.
The globalization of national securities markets will also magnify the
import of the Proposal beyond its Community scope.' 3 Securities markets
are becoming more international for a number of reasons: technological
innovations facilitating the exchange of information; lessened regulatory
restrictions, including the removal of foreign exchange controls; greater
access to financial information for investors; and greater shareholder desire to diversify risks and earn higher returns. 4 Acquisitions in the securities markets are occurring to an ever-increasing extent on an international level.15 Foreign companies are now making significant tender
offers for United States companies as part of their worldwide strategies.' 6 United States companies are already or will be taking similar
steps."a Thus, international tender offers are quickly becoming a global
reality. Though much of this globalization is directly attributable to concerns for 1992, not all such offers arise from those considerations.
Rather, many companies now view global investment as an economic
necessity.1 " As the wave of international mergers and acquisitions gath-

11.

For a detailed study on the effect of 1992 on the United States, see U.S.

TRADE COMMISSION, PUB. No.

INT'L

2204,

THE EFFECTS OF GREATER ECONOMIC INTEGRATION WITHIN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ON THE UNITED STATES (1989); see
also INTERNATIONAL DIVISION, U.S. CHAMBER OF CoM., EUROPE 1992: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE FOR AMERICAN BUSINESSES (1989) (available from: (202) 463-5460).

12. Lublin & Forman, Battle of Britain: Europe's Merger Boom Triggers an Invasion by U.S. Deal Makers, Wall St. J., Aug. 23, 1989, § A, at 1, col. 6.
13. In its report to members of Congress in April 1989, the United States General
Accounting Office stated that "[tihe internationalization of securities markets is inevitable." GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/NSIAD-89-115, NATIONAL SECURITY
AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: REGULATION OF

INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS 2 (1989) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. See also
INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION ACT OF 1989, H.R. REP.

No. 240, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), reprinted in 135 CONG. REC. H5870 (daily ed.
Sept. 25, 1989).
14. GAO REPORT, supra note 13, at 9.
15. For an analysis of the growth of foreign investment in United States stocks over
the last seven years, see id. at 9; see also Berger, The EuropeanMarkets Try to Coordinate, Unify Conflicting Merger Law, 12 Nat'l L.J., Nov. 6, 1989, § S, at 14, col. 1.
16. See, e.g., Grand Met's Grand Design, Fortune, Nov. 7, 1988, at 12, col. 1.
17. For the growth of United States purchases of foreign stocks, see GAO REPORT,
supra note 13, at 10.
18. For the increasing importance of international tender offers, see Goezer, Mills,
Gresham & Sullivan, The Role of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in
TransnationalAcquisitions, 22 INT'L LAW. 615, 616 (1988).
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ers force, changes in the European regulation of tender offers should be
of obvious import to all securities lawyers.
The Proposal and the resulting legislation within the Community are
also likely to lead to increased United States legal participation in European tender offers in the future. In the past, businesspeople have often
been able to negotiate European mergers without intensive legal assistance because national regulations or customary practice were not comprehensive enough to require such legal participation. The Proposal and
other sophisticated Community-wide legislation on tender offers will
cause a fundamental change. The complexity of the legislation will require that lawyers take an increasingly more prominent role. United
States companies seeking European acquisitions will have to rely more
heavily on their legal counsel to lead them through the ever more complicated legislation. United States lawyers should prepare for these possibilities now.
B.

Overview of the Proposal and the Williams Act

In the United States, the Williams Act governs the tender offer process
on the national level.1 9 For the most part, the Williams Act regulates the
flow of information rather than the substantive rights of management or
bidders. It generally requires that bidders20 make full and fair disclosure
to investors of the terms and conditions of their tender offers.2" An important aspect of the Williams Act is the manner in which it treats the
participants in a tender offer. As noted by the Supreme Court in Edgar
v. MITE Corp.,22 Congress took care in structuring the Williams Act to
"avoid tipping the scales either in favor of management or in favor of the
person making the takeover bids." 2 Thus, in some respects, the federal
law creates a level playing field from which the shareholders can benefit.
The vast majority of states, however, have enacted anti-takeover statutes
19. The Act regulates both tender offers and the taking of significant equity positions
by shareholders. This Article will concentrate on the Act's tender offer provisions, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78n(d)-(e) (1988).
20. Article 2 of the Proposal uses the term "offeror" to refer to the tender offer
bidder. Proposal, supra note 5, art. 2(2), at 10. In order to simplify the linguistic differences between the Williams Act and the Proposal, this Article identifies the definitions of
the Proposal but uses the Williams Act equivalents where there is a significant difference.
21. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1988). Article 2(1) of the Proposal uses the term "bid" for
the tender offer. Proposal, supra note 5, art. 2(1), at 10.
22. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
23. Id. at 633 (quoting 113 CONG. REC. S24664 (1967) (Remarks of Sen.
Williams)).
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erecting substantive obstacles against hostile bids.24 In fact, these statutes
have shifted the emphasis away from the protection of shareholders. 25
But the Williams Act still remains the primary regulatory focus for national tender offers.26
Like the Williams Act, the Proposal regulates all aspects of the bidding process, ranging from the time the offer must be made 27 to the contents28 and filing 29 of the tender offer document, the publication of the

24. States have enacted various types of anti-takeover legislation. At the present time,
the most visible type of anti-takeover legislation is the "business combination" statute.
These statutes typically prevent mergers between a target and another entity for a period
of three to five years after a bidder has made what management considers to be an
unacceptable acquisition of a certain percentage of the target's stock. See, e.g., DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1988), 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2251-56 (Purdon
1989), Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.76 (West 1989); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912 (McKinney 1988).
In addition to the business combination statutes, states have also enacted other types of
anti-takeover legislation. For a discussion of the "fair value appraisal" statutes, see infra
note 41. For examples of "share acquisition statues" that specifically allow the board of
directors to consider constitutencies other than shareholders for corporate decisions, including the evaluation of hostile bids, see infra note 96. For examples of share acquisition statutes, which make the right of a shareholder to vote his shares contingent on the
vote of the majority of the other shareholders, see IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-1-23-142-11 (Burns Supp. 1989); FLA. STAT. ANN., § 607.109 (West 1989); see also S.1310,
1989 Sess., §§ 2571-75 (Pa. Oct. 20, 1989). See Booth, The Promise of State Takeover
Statutes, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1635 (1988) (suggesting that share acquisition statutes may
be the most appropriate form of anti-takeover legislation in respect to the protection of
shareholders). For examples of statutes that prohibit the payment of "greenmail," see
infra note 85. Finally, for examples of statutes sanctioning the adoption of "poison
pills," see 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN., §§ 1525(b), 2513 (Purdon 1989); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 7-4-106 (1986); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 415-20 (1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 1610-16.1 (Supp. 1989). The momentum toward the adoption of increasingly burdensome
anti-takeover legislation may be accelerated by the Supreme Court's recent refusal to
hear a challenge to Wisconsin's business combination statute in Amada Acquisition
Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, No. 89-372,

1989 WESTLAW 113708, (1989); see Supreme Court Declines to Review Law in Wisconsin Curbing Hostile Takeovers, Wall St. J., Nov. 7, 1989, § B, at 17, col. 1.

25. See Johnson & Millon, Missing the Point About State Takeover Statutes, 87
MICH. L. REV. 846 (1989) (correspondence).
26. Section 28(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a)
(1988), allows a state to regulate securities transactions "insofar as it does not conflict
with the provisions of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder."
27. Compare Proposal, supra note 5, art. 4, at 10 with 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1)
(1988).
28. Compare Proposal, supra note 5, art. 10, at 11-12 with Schedule 14D-1, 17
C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1989).
29. Compare Proposal, supra note 5, art. 11, at 12 with Rule 14d-3, 17 C.F.R. §
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document,3" the period for acceptance3" of the bid, and the response by
the target's 2 board of directors. 3
As mentioned, the Williams Act focuses mainly on disclosure by the
bidder as the means of achieving its regulatory goals of protecting shareholders. The Proposal, in contrast, seeks to regulate more of the conduct
of the bidding process. In examining how the Proposal operates, the
practitioner should keep in mind that its guiding principle is the equal
treatment 4 of shareholders.
In going beyond disclosure requirements, the Proposal seeks to regulate tender offers in a more substantive manner. Two rules in particular
are noteworthy from a United States perspective. Once a bidder "aim[s]
to acquire" more than thirty-three and one-third percent of the shares of
a company, the Proposal would require it to bid for all of the shares of
the company. 5 Even more dramatic, the Proposal would proscribe target
management defensive tactics during the pendency of a tender offer.3"
Viewed on the whole, the Proposal's more substantive regulation shrinks
the playing field between the hostile bidder and incumbent management.
The Proposal operates to deter a number of tender offers, but at the
same time restricts the actions that target management may take while a
hostile tender offer is pending.3" This shrinking of the playing field,
moreover, occurs at all stages of the tender offer process. The smaller
field, however, may be tilted in favor of the hostile bidder. Although the
bidder has less room to maneuver and may have difficulty entering the
game because of the regulatory obstacles, 8 the target, without the ability

240.14d-3 (1989).
30. Compare Proposal, supra note 5, art. 11 (1), at 12 with Rule 14d-2, 17 C.F.R. §
240.14d-2 (1989) and Rule 14d-4, id. § 240.14d-4.
31.

Compare Proposal, supra note 5, art. 12, at 12 with Rule 14e-l(a), 17 C.F.R. §

240.14e-l(a) (1989).
32.

The proposal identifies the target corporation as the "offeree" company. Propo-

sal, supra note 5, art. 2 (1), at 10.
33.

Compare Proposal, supra note 5, art. 14, at 13 with 15

U.S.C. § 78n(d)(4)

(1988) and Rule 14d-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-9 (1989) and Schedule 14D-9, id. § 14d101.
34. Article 3 reads in full: "Shareholders who are in the same position shall be
treated equally." See Proposal, supra note 5, art. 3, at 10; see text accompanying note

58.
35.

See Proposal, supra note 5, art. 4, at 10.

36. Id. art. 8, at 11.
37.

See infra part II, sections A, B.

38. For a description of relevant procedural obstacles concerning pre-merger notification, see Greenbaum, An American Perspective on the European Commission's
"Amended Proposalfor a Council Regulation on the Control of Concentrations Be-
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to adopt extraordinary defensive tactics, may be chained to the goal post.
Unlike the Second Banking Directive, which aims to establish an internal framework for banking in the Community,"9 the Proposal does not
contain a reciprocity clause aimed at hindering bidders from third countries that themselves discourage bidders from Member States. The Proposal does recognize, though, that Member States may introduce such a
clause into their own national law.4 0 A United States bidder wishing to
enter the Community market in a significant manner and facing such a
clause may have to acquire a European company or form a European
subsidiary in order to enter the playing field at all.
This Article will analyze the Proposal in comparison with the Williams Act, with special emphasis on those aspects of the Proposal that
find no counterpart in the rules and regulations promulgated under the
Williams Act. In addition, the Article will discuss the framework and
provisions of the Proposal in relation to their Williams Act equivalents
in order to illustrate their significant differences and to present a general
approach to the Proposal itself. The information here will interest not
only present and future practitioners of Community law, but also United
States lawyers working in the tender offer area-for the Proposal
presents interesting European responses to diverse problems existing in
the United States scheme of regulation.

tween Undertakings" and its Impact on Hostile Tender Offers, 7 DICK. J. INT'L L. 195
(1989).
39. See Proposalfor a Second Council Directive on the Coordinationof Laws, Regulations, and Administrative Provisions Relating to the Taking Up and Pursuit of the
Business of Credit Institutions and Amending Directive 77/7801EEC: COM (87) 715
Final, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 84) 1 (1988). The original article 7 of the Second
Banking Directive was problematic because it would have prevented United States banks
from opening branches in the Community unless United States banking regulations were
altered to provide reciprocal treatment for European banks. Id. art. 7(5), at 4. The Revised Article 7 of April 13, 1989, however, is unlikely to generate so much concern, for it
only requires that European banks receive national treatment, not reciprocal treatment.
Amended Proposalfor a Second Council Directive on the Coordinationof Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to the Trading-Up and Pursuit of the
Business of Credit Institutions and Amending Directive 77/780/EEC Com (89) 190
Final SYN 120, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C. 167) (1989).
40. See supra note 6. See also, Proposal, supra note 5, art. 21(1)(b), at 14, which
grants the Contact Committee (discussed infra, text accompanying note 50) the power to
"ensure concerted action . . . by the Member States in order to obtain reciprocal treatment" by third countries. Id.
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II.

ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSAL

A.

The Bid Obligation

Perhaps the most striking aspect of the Proposal is its requirement on
the extent of a bid. Article 4 mandates that any person "aiming to acquire" the voting rights to more than one-third of the securities of a
company (including shares that person already owns) must bid for all
the securities of that company.41 This provision helps ensure against depriving minority shareholders of their economic and voting rights in the
corporation. 42 These shareholders would be able to sell all of their shares
and avoid the situation in which the hostile bidder, after gaining control,
can squeeze them out in a subsequent merger at a price lower than that
offered for the majority shares.4 Article 4 in this way acts to discourage
partial bids made solely for speculative purposes." A bidder is less likely
to launch a speculative bid if it will be required to purchase all the
shares of the target company.
If adopted, this provision, when exercised, will likely require either
judicial refinement or intensive and costly factual investigation. The time

41. Proposal, supra note 5, at art. 4(1), at 10. This provision is analogous to the
"fair value appraisal" statutes enacted by states of the United States as anti-takeover
measures to ensure that minority shareholders are not treated unfairly by controlling
shareholders. For a recently-enacted provision of this type, see, e.g., 15 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 2541-48 (Purdon 1988) (effective Oct. 1, 1989), which provides shareholders
with the absolute right to obtain from a bidder who holds more than 20% of the voting
shares of a target corporation the highest price that bidder has paid for shares of the
company within the 90 day period ending on and including the date the bidder acquires
20% ownership. Moreover, the provision also allows shareholders the right to demand an
appraisal if the shareholders are unable to agree with the bidder on the value of the
shares. See also ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 910(9) (Supp. 1989).
On the federal level, although there are no directly comparable securities regulations
in force, the Tender Offer Reform Act of 1987, H.R. 2172, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 13
(1987), would have created a duty to make a tender offer if bidders sought to acquire
more than 10% of the target company's stock.
42. See Proposal, supra note 5, art. 3, at 10, which provides that shareholders in the
same position "shall be treated equally." For an earlier Community version of this principle, see, Council Directive of 5 March 1979, Coordinating the Conditions for the
Admission of Securities to Official Stock Exchange Listing (1912791EEC),22 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 66) sched. C(2)(a), at 21 (1979). The schedule states that "The Company shall ensure equal treatment for all shareholders who are in the same position." Id.
43. See also Proposal, supra note 5, art. 16, at 13, which provides for an automatic
revision of a bid where a price is offered that is higher than the one stated in the offer
document. Thus, the consideration would be increased for those shareholders who had
already accepted the bid. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1988).
44. See Eur. Rep., supra note 6, at 3.

932

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 22:923

at which a buyer "aims" to acquire more than one-third of a company
will undoubtedly be an issue of heated dispute. A bidder's self-serving
declaration may not be acceptable to establish the time at which it decided to acquire the requisite shares. Targets will argue that the trigger
occurred prior to the time announced by the bidder, leading to charges of
a violation of the bidding requirement. Resolution of this issue is likely
to become central to any hostile tender offer.
Even if a bidder is found in violation of the bidding requirement, the
nature and scope of the resulting remedies is unclear. Article 6 of the
Proposal provides for the creation of a supervisory authority by each
Member State.4 5 The supervisory authority would have the power to
regulate tender offers for companies maintaining their registered office in
that Member State."' Article 6 also provides the supervisory authorities
with the power to remedy certain disclosure deficiencies.4 7 There is,
however, no specific reference to remedies that could force an unwilling
bidder either to comply with the Proposal or to dispose of the number of
shares it holds in excess of the total bid threshold.
Adding another level of complexity is the fact that the Proposal has
not engraved the thirty-three and one-third percent figure in white marble. Each of the Member States is free to set the trigger at a lower level.
The Proposal gives the supervisory authority of each Member State the
power to set the triggering percentage for the total bid obligation or to
grant exemptions from the bid obligation altogether.4 Because these supervisory authorities would probably be protective of domestic companies, they would be likely to set low trigger thresholds and unlikely to
grant exemptions favorable to hostile outside bidders. In the United
States, where individual states have regulated tender offers, these states
have acted to protect local interests, i.e. the target corporation.49 The
supervisory authorities, however, would not be entirely autonomous. The
Proposal would create a "Contact Committee" to oversee and resolve
problems arising from differences in each Member State's implementation of the Proposal 5 0 The actions of the Contact Committee, discussed
below, 5' may serve to curtail, at least to some extent, any wide variation

45. Proposal, supra note 5, art. 6(1), at 10. The supervisory authority, however, may
delegate this power to other authorities, associations, or private bodies. Id.
46. Id. art. 6(3), at 11.
47. Id. art. 6(2), at 10.
48. Such an exemption might be warranted where a bidder reaches the required
threshold unintentionally. See Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 7.
49. See supra notes 24, 41; infra notes 85, 96.
50. Proposal, supra note 5, art. 21, at 14.
51. See text accompanying notes 153-58.
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in the triggering level.
In contrast to the Proposal, the Williams Act imposes no obligation at
any time to bid for all the securities of a company. 52 The Williams Act
does have certain disclosure requirements that take effect once a bidder
has acquired five percent of the equity securities of a company5 3 or
makes a tender offer for at least that amount." The bidder must then
reveal its future intentions concerning that company, including its intention to make a tender offer, and must report any material increase or
decrease in the amount of any class of shares it beneficially owns.55 In
this last respect, the Williams Act is far less onerous than the Proposal.
Indeed, article 17 of the Proposal would require that not only the bidder,
but also any holder of one percent or more of the voting rights of the
bidder, the target company, or "any other company whose securities are
offered by way of consideration" must declare "all acquisitions" of the
target company to the competent supervisory authority after the bid is
announced.5 6 In this way, the Proposal presents a much more intrusive
requirement. Not only must persons other than the bidder make such
disclosure, but also no threshold of materiality exists for such disclosure
obligations. The bidder or holder must report all acquisitions, and, thus,
on the European field, all the players become known.
The purpose of the Proposal's disclosure requirement in this regard is
to ensure that some shareholders do not receive a higher price than other
shareholders for their shares during the course of a tender offer.57 When

52. Various states, however, have enacted statutes of similar effect. See supra note
41.
53. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1988). This provision requires that a public announcement be made within 10 days after such acquisition. Commentators have suggested that
the length of this window period has in some cases given rise to harmful securities conduct, for bidders have sometimes acquired a significant amount of stock during the 10
days prior to the public announcement of acquisition. For a recent legislative response to
this difficulty, see The Investor Equality Act of 1989, S. 1658, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1989), § 3, 135 CONG. REC. S11,689, S11,690 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1989) (introduced by
Senator Shelby), which would decrease the window period from 10 days to 5 days.
54. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1988).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(2) (1988); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13 d-2(a) (1988). This provision
of the Williams Act is similar to the recently passed Council Directive of 12 December
1988, On the Information to be Publishedwhen a Major Holding in a Listed Company
is Acquired or Disposed of (8816271EEC), 31 O.J. EUR. COM. (No. L 348) 62 (1988).
In this directive the Community Council mandates that each entity or natural person will
have to notify the competent authority upon reaching a 10% ownership position of companies listed on a stock exchange. Moreover, the shareholder must report changes in
ownership surpassing certain specified thresholds. See id. art. 4, at 63.
56. Proposal, supra note 5, art. 17(2), at 13-14.
57. See Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 7.
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a one percent holder acquires shares of the target at a price higher than
that of the published tender offer, the public offer becomes automatically
revised so as to offer the same terms to all shareholders. Thus, all shareholders would be treated equally 8 by receiving the same price. The Proposal goes to great lengths to achieve its goal of equal treatment.
The Williams Act implicitly allows partial tender offers even though
it imposes rigorous fairness safeguards on all tender offers, including
those for less than one hundred percent of the equity securities of a target company. An offer must be open to all holders of a class of equity
securities. 59 The highest price offered to an individual shareholder must
be offered to all other shareholders to whom the offer is made. 0 In addition, if fewer than all shares are tendered, shares must be purchased on a
pro rata basis.61
The Williams Act's willingness to permit partial tender offers is not
entirely advantageous to shareholders. In the past, both target management and hostile bidders have made partial tender offers, which may
have led to certain abuses,62 including coercive effects on shareholders.
Because partial offers are for fewer than all the shares, a bidder would
be able to offer a higher price per share than it could offer for all the
target's stock.63 Shares not bought pursuant to the offer are, therefore,
often left with a market value far below the tender price.6 4 These shares
are sometimes bought in a subsequent merger at a lower price or bought
in exchange for securities of lesser value than the tender price. Thus,
shareholders who do not tender at the initial price of the so-called twotiered offer risk being frozen out at the lower price at the backend
merger. 65

58. See Proposal, supra note 5, art. 3, at 10.
59.
60.
61.

Rule 14d-10, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10 (1988).
Id.; 15 U.S.c. § 78n(d)(7) (1988).
15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1988); see also Rule 14d-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8

(1988).
62. See Gilson & Kraakman, Delaware'sIntermediate Standardfor Defensive Tactics: Is there Substance to ProportionalityReview?, 44 Bus. LAw. 247, 254-55 (1989).
These authors identify abuses in three areas: the partial bid deprives shareholders of a
better offer from target management; the disparate treatment distorts shareholders' perception of the offer; and mistrust of management causes shareholders mistakenly to accept an underpriced hostile bid. Id. at 267. See also Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted
Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1695, 171735 (1985).

63. See, Bradley & Rosenzweig, Defensive Stock Repurchases, 99 HARV. L.
1378 (1986).
64. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 62, at 255.
65. Id.

REv.
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Hostile bidders are often not the only participants in a takeover battle.
In certain cases, a management-led self-tender may be more coercive of
shareholders than a hostile tender offer. When target management makes
a self-tender for a percentage of the target's own shares in response to a
hostile offer, not only might management's higher partial bid appear
more attractive to the shareholders, but it also may seem more secure,
and shareholders may feel coerced into accepting it. The market price for
the remaining shares may drop notably after a self-tender,"8 and the
shareholders will not want to risk being left with shares of lesser value.
The Delaware Chancery Court found an example of such coercion in
AC-Acquisitions Care v. Anderson, Clayton & Co. 67 In that case, in
response to a hostile tender offer launched at fifty-six dollars per share,
management launched a self-tender for sixty-five percent of the target's
stock at sixty dollars per share. The court found the self-tender coercive
because it effectively precluded acceptance of any and all other hostile
tender offers.68
Hostile bidders in the United States, however, are far less likely to
make a two-tiered offer now than five to ten years ago. 69 Judicial decisions have often favored management's actions to combat such offers.
Moreover, the availability of junk bond financing has until recently loosened the financial constrictions on bidders, thus reducing the economic
impetus for paying less to the holdout shareholders.7 0 The present difficulty with junk bonds is, however, likely to have a certain impact on the
availability of funds for bidders. Without any contrary regulation by the
European Community, two-tiered tender offers could once again become
a significant part of tender offer activity. The Community has no judicial
precedent condemning such practice. In addition, if it were more difficult
for a bidder to raise funds, the bidder might have a greater economic
need to make such a bid.
Article 4 of the Proposal would eliminate concern about abusive twotiered tender offers by its requirement of a total tender offer if the bidder
wishes to acquire more than thirty-three and one-third percent of a company. Of course, the effect of the Proposal's requirement will depend to
some extent on judicial interpretation. Besides the "aim to acquire" lan66. See id.
67. 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986).
68. Id. at 114.
69. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 62, at 254 n.29.
70. Gilson & Kraakman also attribute the demise of the two-tiered offer to the creation of an informal auction period under section 14d-8 of the Williams Act which in
1982 lengthened the minimum offering period of a partial tender offer (including a twotiered offer) from 10 to 20 days. Id.
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guage, another area of the Proposal requiring interpretation is the provision that the accumulation of voting rights necessary to trigger the total
offer obligation may be met by entities "acting in concert, '7' a concept
also addressed under the Williams Act.7 2 The interpretation of this language may be quite significant 73 in arriving at the provision's eventual
scope.
Irrespective of the interpretation of this provision, the acquisition of
thirty-three percent (that is, just less than the threshold) of a company's
securities may enable the bidder to obtain enough effective control of the
company so that no further acquisitions would be needed. At that level,
the bidder might be able to effect certain actions that may be coercive of
a substantial minority of shareholders and, thereby, to some extent circumvent the Proposal's safeguards. In Community law, however, numerous company decisions (such as mergers, splits, and capital write-offs)
require acceptance by sixty-six and two-thirds percent of the shareholders,7 4 making control through a minority position quite difficult.
There is little doubt that the Proposal's requirement would severely
limit the financial and strategic flexibility of the bidder. Neither hostile
bidders nor management will be able to make significant partial tender
offers. These regulations can even prohibit beneficial management selftenders.75 In eliminating some of the abuses that partial tender offers
generate, article 4 of the Proposal also may have eliminated some important benefits. Moreover, to some extent, article 4 would remove the
71. Proposal, supra note 5, art. 4(2)(c), at 10. This provision includes the "voting
rights of persons acting in concert with the offeree" in calculating the total of the voting
rights held by the offeree.
72. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(2) (1988).
73. Article 2(5) defines "persons acting in concert" as "persons who, pursuant to an
agreement, cooperate with one another with the aim of acquiring the securities of a company.". Proposal, supra note 5, art. 2(5), at 10. It is uncertain whether this definition
will provide concrete guidance or whether courts will interpret this language broadly or
narrowly. This language is central to the Proposal and appears in articles 10(1)(e)(dd),
10(2)(c), 16, 17(2), and 20(3). For a United States case broadly construing acting in
concert language in the context of state anti-takeover statute principles, see, Pennwalt
Corp. v.Centaur Partners, 1989 WESTLAW 11263 (E.D. Pa. 1989); see also Citizens
First Bancorp, Inc. v. Harreld, 559 F.Supp. 867 (W.D. Ky. 1982). Other courts, however, have read the acting in concert concept more restrictively. See, e.g., Camelot Indus.
v. Vista Resources, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1174 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Pantry Pride, Inc. v.
Rooney, 598 F. Supp. 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Nat'l Home Prod. v. Gray, 416 F. Supp,
1293, 1324 (D.C. Del. 1976).
74. See Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 7, at 9.
75. For example, a pro rata buy-back of shares by management, when not in competition with a bid from a hostile bidder, may be beneficial to all shareholders by giving
them a fair price for some shares and a higher return on equity for the others.
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weapon of surprise from the bidder's arsenal. As soon as the bidder
"aims" to acquire more than one-third of a company, it must meet all
the disclosure obligations of article 10.76 There is no window period.
Targets will thereby receive the strategic advantage of obtaining earlier
information concerning the bidder's plans. The determination of the time
when the bidder "aims" to acquire more than one-third of the target will
thus likewise be important in this regard.
B.

Restrictions on Target Company Defensive Actions

The Proposal, unlike the Williams Act, puts significant restrictions on
target management during the pendency of a tender offer.77 After target
management receives notice of a bidder's intention to make an offer, article 8 of the Proposal imposes two prohibitions: management may not
issue securities carrying voting rights 78 ("poison pills"); 79 and more
broadly, the target may not "engage in transactions which do not have
the character of current operations concluded under normal conditions." 8 Thus, under the Proposal, target management would have
greater difficulty adopting the panoply of tender offer defenses so com76. See supra note 28.
77. This provision is similar to, and to some extent may rely on, The City Code on
Take-overs and Mergers; see 7 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND paras. 790-95 (4th ed.
1974) (the code is in fact "a code of business ethnics, not a code of law" and is administered by the London Panel on Take-overs and Mergers); see, e.g., MacLachlan & Mackesy, supra note 6, at 386-88. Continental Codes are, in general, less restrictive of target
management. Id. at 376-77.
78. See Proposal, supra note 5, art. 8(a), at 11.
79. In general, courts have allowed poison pills for a certain period of time as a
means of allowing management to obtain a higher price for the target company. Poison
pills, however, cannot remain in place indefinitely and sometimes may not be adopted at
all. For recent cases in which Delaware courts have ordered the removal of poison pills,
see City Capital Assocs. v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (1988); Grand Metropolitan PLC
v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988); In re Holly Farms Corp., 564 A.2d
342 (Del. Ch. 1989). See also, Note, Poison Pills as a Negotiating Tool: Seeking a
Cease-Firein the Corporate Takeover Wars, 1987 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 459, 463-64
(describing poison pills); Helman & Junewicz, A Fresh Look at Poison Pills, 42 Bus.
LAW. 771 (1987). See also Corporate Take-over Reform Act of 1989, S. 1244, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess., § 5 (1989), 135 CONG. REc. S7327, S7329 (daily ed. June 23, 1989)
(would prohibit poison pills unless approved by the majority of the outstanding shares of
the company); Metzenbaum, Armstrong Propose Bill to Reform Shareholders Rights,
Proxies, 21 Sec. Reg. L. Rep. (BNA) 944 (June 30, 1989). The Investor Responsibility
Research Center reports that as of mid-June 1989, 616 of the 1440 largest public companies in the United States had adopted poison pill plans. 21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
1630 (Nov. 3, 1989).
80. Proposal, supra note 5, art. 8(b), at 11.
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mon in the United States: 81 selling attractive company assets ("crown
jewels"); 8 2 attracting bidders it views more favorably ("white
knights");" repurchasing its own stock;84 providing premium payments
in reacquiring stock from the acquirors ("greenmail");85 and engaging in
agreements by which a white knight may
receive an option to buy a
86
large block of target shares ("lock up").
Removing the great bulk of management defensive options would have
the obvious effect of eliminating the hostile bidder's most burdensome
obstacles. As such, it would be far more difficult for management to delay the tender offer solely for purposes of its own entrenchment.8 " This

81. This type of proscription has similarly been suggested in respect to the Community proposal on pre-merger notification in order to promote its announced goal of increasing the international competitive ability of European companies. See Greenbaum,
supra note 38.
82.

HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, EQUITY IN FOREIGN AND Do-

MESTIC CREDIT AND TENDER OFFER REFORM, H.R. REP. No. 1028, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 7 n.8 (1984) (defining the term "sale of crown jewels"); Mills Acquisition Co. v.
MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1286 n.37 (Del. 1988); Cottle v. Storer Communication, 849 F.2d 570 (11th Cir. 1988).
83. Gillette Co. v. RB Partners, 693 F. Supp. 1266, 1271 (D. Mass. 1988); Mobil
Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 367-68 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 982 (1982).
84. This may be accomplished through a "Dutch Auction," where management tries
to buy out the bidder. See, e.g., Pennwalt Corp. v. Centaur Partners, 1989 WESTLAW
11263 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
85. See Comment, Greenmail: Can the Abuses be Stopped, 80 Nw. U.L. REV. 1271

(1986); Note, Greenmail: Targeted Stock Repurchases and the Management Entrenchment Hypothesis, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1045 (1988). To a certain extent, however, the use
of greenmail may be ebbing. The Internal Revenue Code has recently been amended to
provide for harsh treatment of greenmail payments. See I.R.C. § 5881 (1989). Moreover,
section 4 of Senate Bill 1244, supra note 79, 135 CONG. REC., at S7329, would prohibit
greenmail unless approved by the majority vote of all the shareholders of the company.
On the state level, see S.1310, 1989 Sess., §§ 2571-75 (Pa. 1989) (would provide a private right of action to recover greenmail profits and also allow recovery for all costs,
including attorney's fees, in obtaining such disgorgement). See also TENN. CODE ANN. §
48-35-501-505 (1988) (held unconstitutional to the extent applicable to out-of-state
corporations in Tyson Foods, Inc. v. McReynolds, 865 F.2d 89 (6th Cir. 1989)); Michigan Business CorporationAct, § 21.200 (368) 4 Corp. Statutes (BNA) (1989). See also
S. 1658, supra note 53, § 7, 135 CONG. REC. at 11,691 (would provide a private right of
action to enforce greenmail provision).
86, See, e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261; In re Holly
Farms, 57 U.S.L.W. 2403 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1988). Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986); Hanson Trust PLC v. ML
SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986).
87. In discussing the relationship between the Williams Act and the Hart-ScottRodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15c-15h, 16, 18a (1976),
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proscription gains reinforcement from the Proposal's unlimited requirement that shareholders in the same position be treated equally."' This
provision may be similar in effect to the Securities and Exchange Commission's recently adopted Rule 19c-4, 9 which prevents a company from
taking action that would reduce the voting power of existing common
stock shareholders. Thus, under the Proposal, directors will not be able
to distort the rights of certain shareholders by creating new classes of
stock with disparate voting rights.
The result of the Proposal's general proscriptions could be that management may attempt to accelerate the adoption of these defensive mechanisms. But, although in the United States management does enact numerous anti-takeover devices prior to the appearance of an actual hostile
bid, it would seem unlikely that management would expend the effort to
enact all of its potential defenses prior to the appearance of an actual
hostile offer. In fact, many of these devices, for example, seeking a white
knight or selling the crown jewels, would be senseless without the presence or threat of a hostile bid.
Management's hands are not completely tied, however. Under the
Proposal, management may adopt defenses with the authorization of the
shareholdersY0 In the presence of a tangible hostile bid, though, shareholders are probably unlikely to grant management such authorization
and risk losing the premium offered in a hostile tender offer. As soon as
a hostile bid appears on the horizon in the United States, arbitrageurs
quickly move to buy the target's stock. These arbitrageurs can aid the
efforts of a hostile bidder and frequently outnumber shareholders who

Representative Rodino stated:
In the case of cash tender offers, more so than in other mergers, the equities include time and the danger of undue delay. This bill in no way intends to repeal or
reverse the congressional purpose underlying the 1968 Williams Act, or the 1970
amendments to that act.... Lengthier delays will give the target firm plenty of
time to defeat the offer, by abolishing cumulative voting, arranging a speedy defensive merger, quickly ... negotiating costly lifetime employment contracts for incumbent management. And the longer the waiting period, the more the target's
stock may be bid up in the market, making the offer more costly-and less successful. Should this happen, it will mean that shareholders of the target firm will be
effectively deprived of the choice that cash tenders give to them: Either accept the
offer and thereby gain the tendered premium, or reject the offer.
122 CONG. REc. 30,877 (1976).
88. See Proposal, supra note 5, art. 3, 10, at 10-12.
89. Rule 19c-4 provides that no stock may be listed on a securities exchange if securities are issued that nullify, restrict, or disparately reduce the per share voting rights of
an outstanding class of common stock. 17 C.F.R. §240.19c-4(a) (1989).
90. Proposal, supra note 5, art. 8, at 11.
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might have approved a management-devised anti-takeover measure in
normal circumstances. Although the risk arbitrage community in Europe
may not yet be as well-developed or as active as that in the United
States, there will likely be sufficient growth in this area to ensure some
resistance to blatantly protectionist measures proposed by management
during a pending hostile offer.
Moreover, the Proposal does not prohibit a corporation from having
outstanding two classes of stock with unequal voting rights.9" A minority
holding the stronger voting stock, and thus the bulk of the voting power,
may be able to grant management defensive powers over the will of the
majority of the shareholders, who hold weaker voting power.
In any case, the judicial interpretation of the "character of current
operations" will determine much of article 8's effect. If a company is
already negotiating a potential large-scale merger with one company and
another group launches a hostile tender offer, will article 8 forbid the
first transaction? The United States provided an example in the recent
Paramountv. Time, Inc. decision; Judge Allen of the Delaware Chancery Court allowed Time to continue with its merger with Warner Communications, in part because it was pursuant to a long-term plan. 2
Should more leeway be given to mergers that are almost complete, or
should all merger activity be immediately stopped notwithstanding the
tremendous costs? This type of situation may lead to an exercise of the
discretionary powers of the supervisory authorities.
In addition, the Proposal's explicit regard for the interests of employees 93 may also indicate a willingness to allow management to consider
factors other than shareholder wealth and democracy in reaching a decision when faced with a hostile tender offer. These considerations may
also enter into the decisionmaking process of the supervisory authorities.
The uncertainty inherent in these provisions is rendered more problematic by the discretion given the supervisory authorities to authorize
certain defensive actions."" But the Proposal does explicitly limit the defensive capability of the target management. The question is not whether
management will have the last word, but rather whether the Proposal
will leave management totally defenseless or only in a greatly weakened
91. The Proposal applies to takeovers or bids on "all holders of the securities, or the
securities of a particular class or classes . . . ." Id. art. 1, at 9.
92. Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc., 58 U.S.L.W. 2070 (Del. Ch. July 14,
1989).
93. Target management must inform the employees about both the bid and management's assessment of it. See Proposal, supra note 5, art. 19, at 14. See also infra note
139 and accompanying text.
94. See Proposal, supra note 5, art. 8(b), at 11.
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state.
In the United States, there are few legislative restrictions on the actions of target management facing a hostile tender offer.95 Some states,
such as Pennsylvania,9 6 provide expansive definitions of fiduciary duty
that allow, and sometimes compel, management to consider a wide variety of interests beyond shareholder wealth and democracy, even in the
face of a hostile tender offer.97 Moreover, some commentators feel that

95. But see S. 1244, supra note 79, which would, in part, restrict management's
ability to adopt poison pills, pay greenmail, or grant themselves golden parachutes. Other
bills have been presented to restrict such activities. See, e.g., S. 1658, supra note 53,
Tender Offer Disclosure and Fairness Act of 1987, S. 1323, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987), 134 CONG. REc. S7924 (daily ed. June 16, 1987); Tender Offer Reform Act of
1987, H.R. 2172, supra note 41. Congress, however, has not enacted any such measures.
Courts, though, have placed restrictions on directors during the tender offer process by
imposing on directors fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the corporation and to the
shareholders. See, e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1250
(Del. 1988); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983); Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
These duties are especially vigorous where a sale of corporate control occurs. Smith v.
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985). However, absent a showing of bad faith,
recklessness, or self-dealing, the business judg-nent rule often protects directors. See, e.g.,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (1983); 42 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. §§ 511, 1721 (Purdon Supp. 1989); In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 57 U.S.L.W. 2482
(Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989); In re J.P. Stevens & Co., 542 A.2d 770, 780 (Del. Ch. 1988);
AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986).
But when corporate control is at stake, directors must fulfill an enhanced duty before
they can receive the protection of the rule. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493
A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. Super. 1985). Moreover, where the management of a target
company determines that an auction of the target is necessary to obtain its full value for
the shareholders, an enhanced duty is still mandated. Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986).
96. 42 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. § 8363 (Purdon 1982), reenacted as 15 PA. CONG.
STAT. ANN. §§ 511, 1721 (Purdon 1989) (reenactment effective October 1, 1989). Sections 511 and 1721 of Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310 would even more greatly reduce
management's fiduciary duty to shareholders by statutorily providing that shareholder
interests are not controlling, S. 1310, 1989 Sess., §§ 511(b)(4), 1721(c)(4) (Pa. 1989).
Moreover, these sections would almost completely remove fiduciary duty constraints from
management during a corporate control contest. See also OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §
1701.59 (Anderson 1983); Mo. REv. STAT. §351.347 (Supp. 1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
607.11 (4) (1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN § 33-313(e) (Supp. 1989); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 23-1-35-1(d) (Burns 1989).
97. On a related note, see The Community and Jobs Protection Act of 1989, H.R.
679, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), 135 CONG. REc. H109 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1989)
which would require community impact statements on certain mergers reducing employment in any community by at least 100 persons and, under certain circumstances, would
allow the Federal Trade Commission to recommend the taking of legal action against
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retaining broad defensive mechanisms for management may actually
maximize competition for the target corporation. In this way, one
might argue that restrictions on target management could harm shareholders by preventing management from taking actions that might result
in an active auction and thus higher premiums for the shareholders.
Thus, it would not be surprising if the present resistance in Europe to
hostile tender offers begins to manifest itself in the form of greater defensive flexibility for target management. As the Proposal now stands, however, target management will be stripped to a significant degree of much
of its protective armor. This does not mean that article 8 would render
target management powerless; it does mean that management would
have much less room to maneuver. Accordingly, management reactions to
a hostile bid may become a less significant factor in Europe than in the
United States.
C.

Tender Offer Disclosure and Documentation

The Proposal provides for disclosure of specific terms of the offer in
article 10 and for broad public disclosure of the tender offer in article 11.
The bidder must file a tender offer document for publication in one or
more national or mass circulation newspapers,99 or otherwise make it
available to the target's shareholders.1 00 In either case, the bidder must
file at least the offer document with the competent supervisory authority." 0' In contrast to the Williams Act, which allows the bidder to surprise the target both with the contents of the tender offer document and
the timing of its release, the Proposal requires that the bidder disclose
the offer document to the target's board of directors before it becomes
public.

10 2

Article 10 provides a list of specifics for the contents of an offer. The
bid must, of course, state the name of the target company' 0 3 and the
bidder.' 04 It must identify the securities for which the bid is made, 0 5 the
such mergers.
98. See Herzel & Shepro, Negotiated Acquisitions: The Impact of Competition in the
United States, 44 Bus. LAW. 301 (1989).
99. Proposal, supra note 5, art. 11(1)(a), at 12.
100. Id. art. 11(1)(b), (c), at 12.
101. Id. art. 11(2), at 12; see supra note 29.
102. See Proposal, supra note 5, art. 7(3), at 11. (note, however, that no lead time is
specified).
103. Compare Proposal, supra note 5, art. 10(1)(a), at 11 with 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d100 (Item 1) (1989).
104. Compare Proposal, supra note 5, art. 10(1)(b), at 11 with 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d100 (Item 2) (1989).
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consideration offered for those securities,"'8 the basis for evaluation
thereof, and, where appropriate, the future indebtedness that the captured target will bear in financing the bid. 107 In addition, the offer must
list the conditions imposed by the bidder that were accepted by the
supervisory authority,10 8 the closing date for acceptances, 0 9 the explicit
intentions of the bidder in regard to continued operation of the target, 1 '
and the special advantages it intends to grant target management. 1 1 If
an offer includes the issue of new securities, the bidder must also provide
certain evaluative information to allow those considering the offer to
1 12
make an informed judgment.
There are significant differences between the Proposal and the Williams Act in the substance of the financial information a bidder must
disclose. The Proposal would require less rigorous disclosure concerning
the funds used for making the offer. In regard to cash consideration,
article 10(g) merely provides that the bidder must disclose "guarantees
provided by the offerer regarding payment, and, where appropriate, a
statement concerning any future indebtedness of the offeree company to
finance the bid." ' The Williams Act, on the other hand, specifically
mandates detailed disclosure of the source and amount of funds or other
consideration for the tender offer.11 4 Moreover, the Williams Act requires disclosure of the financial statements of bidders who are not natural persons or who are controlled by a non-natural person. 5 The Wil-

105. Compare Proposal, supra note 5, art. 10(1)(d), at 11 with 17 C.F.R. § 240.
14d-100 (Item 1) (1989).
106. Compare Proposal, supra note 5, art. 10(1)(g), at 11 with 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d100 (Item 1) (1989).
107. Proposal, supra note 5, art. 10(1)(g), at 11. The requirements as to disclosure
of future plans of indebtedness are geared toward preventing leveraged buyouts where
management skims off all the profits. Eur. Rep., supra note 6, at 3; compare 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14d-100 (Item 4) (1989).
108. Proposal, supra note 5, art. 10(1)(i), at 12.
109. Id. art. 10(1)(j), at 12.
110. Compare id. art. 10(1)(I), at 12 with 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (Item 5) (1989).
111. Compare Proposal, supra note 5, art. 10(1)(m), at 12 with 17 C.F.R. §
240.14d-100 (Item 8) (1989).
112. Proposal, supra note 5, art. 10(3), (4), at 12.
113. Id. art. 1(g), at 12 (emphasis added).
114. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100, (Item 4) (1989). Thus, the offeror must disclose the
source and total amount of funds for the purchase of the maximum number of securities
sought by the tender, id. (Item 4(a)); provide a summary of each loan agreement or
arrangement including all their material terms, id. (Item 4(b)(1)); and describe plans to
finance or repay such borrowings, id. (Item 4(c)).
115. Id. (Item 9). Bidders who are not natural persons must furnish material current
financial information. If the bidder is controlled by an entity that is not a natural person,
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liams Act further calls for the attachment of a copy of any loan
agreements for the purchase of shares pursuant to the tender offer.116
It is somewhat incongruent that with its emphasis on protecting shareholders, 117 the Proposal does not require greater disclosure to the shareholders of the viability of the offer by requiring disclosure of details as to
the source of funds. The reasons may be both cultural and political. The
Community may be hesitant to encroach too much on what has traditionally been considered national regulatory territory. The local supervisory authorities will have some leeway to enact stricter national disclosure standards.118 Thus, they may potentially give greater effect to the
goal of shareholder protection embodied in the Proposal. But supervisory
authorities will likely find motivation for imposing harsher disclosure requirements because such measures may to some extent diminish the
number of tender offers for companies registered in that Member State.
By discouraging foreign offers, domestic companies will remain better
protected. At present, though, there can be only speculation in this
regard.
D.

Duration and Withdrawal of Bids

Under the Proposal, a bid must remain open for a period of not less
than four weeks nor more than ten weeks from the date of publication of
the actual tender offer." This open period is consistent with the limitations imposed by other provisions of the Proposal in that it reduces the
amount of time within which a tender offer must take place. 120 Under
the Williams Act, an offer must remain open for a period of at least
twenty business days from the date of the offer's publication,121 but the
offer can in essence remain open indefinitely as long as the bidder ex-

current adequate financial information regarding the parent must also be furnished. Id.
116. Id. (Item 11).
117. See, e.g., Proposal, supra note 5, arts. 3, 4, at 10.
118. See id. art. 6, at 10.
119. See id. art. 12(1), at 12.
120. Note, however, that under article 15 of the Proposal, the offeror may revise the
terms of the bid at any time before the last week of the period of acceptance announced
under article 10. Whenever a bid is revised, the period for acceptance is automatically
extended by one week, Id. arts. 15, 10, at 11-13.
121. Rule 14e-1(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a) (1989). Under S. 1658, supra note 53,
any person making a tender offer would be required to keep the offer open for a period
of at least 35 business days from its date of publication. If, during that period, a qualified
employee stock option plan notified the offeror or issuer of securities that it wished to
acquire additional securities of the issuer on terms substantially equivalent to other offers, the offer would be required to remain open for 95 business days.
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tends the offer.1 2 Legislative proposals have been introduced in Congress to lengthen this open period. 23 Practice in the United States has
shown that a tender offer is often likely to remain open for more than
ten weeks, especially when management is opposed to the offer. The hostile bidder may often find extensions of time necessary in order to overcome the various defensive tactics target management has adopted.
As previously noted, although article 8 proscribes defensive actions after the commencement of the offer, it does permit target management to
adopt these tactics in advance. Thus some danger remains that incumbent management may enact delaying tactics. Though the supervisory
authority might extend the offer period,"2 a supervisory authority trying
to protect a domestic corporation will not likely grant a hostile bidder
any advantages not mandated by the Proposal. It is important to note,
though, that in contrast with United States practice, article 8 of the Proposal prevents the target company from carrying out certain activities
during the pendency of the tender offer.1 25 Because the Williams Act
does not impose this corporate paralysis, allowing the offer to remain
open poses less risk of damage to the target. Thus, the greater intrusion
the Proposal brings into the target company while a bid is outstanding
gives greater reason to keep the offer period short.
The Proposal does provide for extensions if a bid is entered in competition with the original bid. If the first bid is not withdrawn,12 6 the time
period for the first bid is extended until the end of the period of the
competing, or later, bid. 2 7 This situation may give the first bidder more
time, but the obstacles faced by the hostile bidder are likely to increase in
number, if not in difficulty, the longer it must wait to consummate its
offer.

128

122. See Rule 14e-l(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a) (1989).
123. See, e.g., S. 1244, supra note 79, § 3, which would require that the tender offer
be kept open 60 days from the date it is first published or sent to shareholders if such
offer is made in anticipation of or response to another person's offer.
124. See Proposal, supra note 5, art. 12(2), at 12.
125. Id. art. 3, at 11.
126. Article 13(1)(a) allows a bidder to withdraw its bid if a later competing bid is
launched. Id. art. 13(1)(a), at 12.
127. See id. art. 20(4), at 14; see supra note 121 for action in the United States
seeking to lengthen the bid period.
128. One economic ramification of an extended period can be seen in the United
States, where arbitrageurs often purchase the stock of what they perceive to be potential
target corporations. Arbitrageurs typically purchase their stocks on margin and incur
significant borrowing costs in the process. Increasing the duration of the tender offer
process also increases the costs for holding on to a target's stock. Thus, because of the
greater costs of carrying the stock, existing arbitrageurs may be less likely to contribute
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Another of the more controversial aspects of the Proposal arises in
relation to the article 4 requirement of making a full tender offer after
reaching a set ownership level. Article 13 allows the withdrawal of a
tender offer only in limited circumstances: when there (is a competing
bid;' 2 9 when the bidder has been unable to obtain authorization for the
issuance of new securities it needs to finance the tender offer;'8 0 when
the stock the bidder wishes to exchange cannot obtain an official stock
exchange listing;' 31 when the bidder fails to obtain the necessary judicial
or administrative authorization; 3 2 when a condition for the bid approved
by the supervisory authority is not fulfilled;' 3 3 and, when other exceptional circumstances occur, as determined by the supervisory
authority.' 34
Under the Williams Act, a bidder may withdraw a tender offer at any
time before purchasing shares pursuant to the bid. A bidder under the
Proposal, however, is not free simply to withdraw its bid and avoid the
requirements of article 4. The Proposal demands a commitment from
those who would step onto the European field. Once a bidder begins the
play, it is required to remain and withstand the potentially ruinous risk
of greatly increased costs. Bidders are more likely either to leave the field
as victors, or to be badly bloodied.
E. Report of the Target's Board of Directors
Both the Proposal and the Williams Act impose on the board of directors of the target corporation reporting duties in response to a tender
offer. The Proposal, however, in a controversial provision, demands a
more comprehensive response by target management. Whereas at present
a minimal response by management may satisfy the informational requirements of the Williams Act, the Proposal requires that the board
draw up a detailed report setting forth its assessment of the bid and
stating its recommendation.' 35 It is likely that this would furnish shareholders with greater and more accurate information concerning management's views of the bid. The United States experience shows the lack of

such a great proportion of their resources to merger activity.
129. Proposal, supra note 5, art. 13(1)(a), at 12.
130. Id. art. 13(1)(b), at 12.
131. Id. art. 13(1)(c), at 12-13.
132. Id. art. 13(1)(d), at 13.
133. Id. art. 13(1)(e), at 13.
134. Id. art. 13(1)(O, at 13.
135. Compare id. art. 14(1), at 13 with Schedule 14D-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240 14d-101,
(Item 4) (1989).
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enthusiasm with which management responds to such requirements; it is
indeed rare when shareholders receive worthwhile guidance from the
minimal information and analysis that United States companies provide.
On the other hand, the extensive disclosure envisaged by the Proposal
may result in justifiable concerns about the disclosure of confidential information and may actually and inadvertently put a target "into play."
This provision would also limit the playing field to some extent by forcing foreign management to present a justifiable opposition to a hostile
bid. Consequently, it would favor the bidder. In the United States, such
information may become available only after extensive discovery during
litigation.
If the offer includes securities for which no stock exchange listing or
application for such listing exists, the Board must include an independent evaluation by an expert approved by the competent supervisory authority." 8' The valuation must state the expert's basis for valuation and
whether the expert believes the consideration offered is "fair and reasonable."' 3 7 The board must make public its report in the manner discussed
above in respect to tender offer documentation. 3 "
This expert opinion on fairness, however, is required only where securities are part of the consideration. It is not required for cash tender
offers.' 9 Without this opinion, a shareholder may find determining the
proper premium for a tender offer transaction difficult. Thus, the board's
opinion may receive undue weight in respect to such an offer and may
not be subject to such rigorous scrutiny as in the United States. 4 A
European preference seems prevalent for tender offers involving securities as part of the consideration;' 4 ' therefore, the problem of insufficient
guidance in respect to all-cash offers may be of lesser importance than

136. Proposal, supra note 5, art. 14(2), at 13. In the United States, neither the Williams Act nor mandates of fiduciary duty specifically require that the directors obtain a
fairness opinion. See, e.g., Cottle v. Store, 849 F.2d 570, 578 (11th Cir. 1988); Litton
Indus. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Smith v.
Van Gorkom, 498 A.2d 858, 876 (Del. 1980). The general practice, however, is to include such an opinion even where the offer is solely for cash. In this manner, directors
are partially protected from claims of breach of fiduciary duty.
137. Proposal, supra note 5, art. 14(2), at 13.
138. Id. art. 14(3), at 13.
139. Id. art. 14(2), at 13 (requiring an expert opinion "[w]here the consideration
offered comprises securities").
140. See, e.g., Joseph v. Shell Oil Co., 482 A.2d 335 (Del. Ch. 1984); In re Fort
Howard Corp. Shareholders Litigation, Civ. No. 9991, Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1988, 1988
WESTLAW 83,147; Herskowitz v. Nutri/System, Inc., 1857 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 1315 (1989).
141. See Lublin & Forman, supra note 12.
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expected from the United States experience.
In addition, the Proposal manifests a concern for employees as well as
stockholders in respect to its disclosure requirements. The board of directors of a target company must inform its employees of any bids made for
the company. Workers' representatives must receive a copy of the tender
offer document, any required evaluative filings, the report by the board
of directors on the bid, and, where appropriate, the expert's valuation
and opinion.14 2 The tension between worker protection and participation
and the promotion of shareholder wealth and democracy is developed to
a greater extent within the Community than within the United States.
Both aspects of this dichotomy will be evident and will provide support
for decisions of the target's board of directors and even the supervisory
authorities.
F. The Community Nature of the Proposal
The Proposal carries with it certain difficulties often inherent in Community legislation. The Proposal grants a great deal of autonomy to the
newly-created supervisory authorities of the Member States. The threshold at which the bidder becomes obligated to bid for all the equity securities of a company may be set at different levels by each of the supervisory authorities.14 3 Moreover, supervisory authorities could conceivably
subvert the purpose of the Proposal by granting on a general basis permission to the management of target companies to adopt defensive measures.144 As supervisory authorities would most likely favor target com45
panies, there is some reasonable basis for anticipating such a tendency.
Even assuming no general trend of this nature on the part of all supervisory authorities, difficulties may still arise. The supervisory authority of
one Member State, for example, might authorize defensive tactics by target management on a more general basis, whereas in the Member State
of the bidder, the supervisory authority may have promulgated contrary
regulations favoring the bidder. Although the supervisory authority of
the Member State in which the target company is located is the regulatory body overseeing the offer,146 confusion may arise when bidders are
subject to differing rules depending on the decision of a foreign regula-

142. Proposal, supra note 5, art. 19, at 14.
143. See id. art. 4(3), at 10.
144. See id. art. 8(b), at 11.
145. The United States experience could suggest that these Member States with only
a few large companies are likely candidates for this type of enactment. Romana, The
Political Economy of Takeovers Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111 (1987).
146. See Proposal, supra note 5, art. 6(4), (3), at 11.
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tory body.
Other less problematic possibilities for variations lie within the Proposal. 4" These differences may be politically necessary in order to achieve
some type of Community-wide tender offer regulation. Nevertheless, unexpected complexities and confusion could arise from tender offers reaching across Member State boundaries. Moreover, these variations may
also create costs and raise uncertainties in respect to takeovers in which
the target spans more than one Member State.
Few states in the United States have failed to enact anti-takeover legislation. A growing number of states have enacted legislation that has
amplified management's arsenal of defenses; each new statute provides
management with another layer of defensive armor. The experience of
the United States attests to the dangers of allowing unfettered local regulation of tender offers. The effect of nearly all these regulations has been
to favor the target company as the states have acted to protect local interests.' 48 Questions of national good or national policy have not necessarily
guided state regulation. In addition, differing and sometimes inconsistent
regulations' 4 9 are arising throughout the United States. Continued development in this direction could potentially interfere severely with the national securities markets. In fact, the Williams Act may in certain cases
be the principal obstacle to total state prohibition of such offers and to a
corresponding disruption of the federal securities system. As the web of
state anti-takeover legislation grows more intricate, however, local interests will exert a greater influence on and may actually threaten the Williams Act's preeminence in respect to national tender offers.
Various authors have attempted to justify state anti-takeover laws as a
means of protecting stakeholders (i.e., managers, creditors, employees,
and certain suppliers) rather than the stockholders of the company.'
But to the extent the Proposal maintains shareholder protection as a primary goal, it is difficult to accept as consistent legislation that would

147. See, e.g., id. art. 12(2), at 12 (modification of period of acceptance); id. art.
13(1)(O, at 13 (withdrawal of bid in exceptional circumstances); id. art. 15(5), at 13
(modification of bids).
148. See supra note 24.
149. See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69, 88-89 (1987) (discussing
this danger). For an example of a state anti-takeover statute that could subject a corporation to inconsistent regulations, see 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2551(d) (Purdon 1989)
(subjects a corporation to Pennsylvania law even after it reincorporates in another state).
See also N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912(a)(13) (McKinney Supp. 1989).
150. See Coffee, The Uncertain Casefor Takeover Reform: An Essay on Stockholders, Stakeholders and Bust-ups, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 435; see also Davis, Epilogue: The
Role of the Hostile Takeover and the Role of the States, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 491.
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promote stakeholder interests"'5 -at
the possible expense of
shareholders.152
The Proposal has tried to minimize such dangers by utilizing the Contact Committee153 to facilitate the "uniform application of this Directive
through regular consultations on ...problems arising in its implementation"' 5' and to ensure that the Member States take concerted action with
respect to reciprocal treatment of foreign tender offers.' 5 In order for
the Proposal to succeed, the Contact Committee will need to play a central role. Otherwise, the supervisory authorities may be left with too
much individual discretion. The Community could profit from United
States mistakes by strongly supervising through the Committee the exercise of discretion by the supervisory authorities. A failure to curtail
abuses of discretion could diminish any real possibility of establishing a
functionally integrated European securities market.
Though the Proposal does provide the Contact Committee with some
powers to curb erring supervisory authorities, the Contact Committee
may not provide the rigorous and continuous supervision necessary to
give effect to the Proposal. The Committee is not an ever-functioning
watchdog mechanism; it would be convened by its chairman on his own
initiative or upon request of one of the Committee members.' 56 If the
Proposal is to be effective, it may be necessary for the Committee to
intervene more actively than perhaps envisaged by the Proposal itself.
Otherwise, one must hope that the mere existence of the Contact Committee will be enough to discourage the bulk of potential abuses by the
individual supervisory authorities, if not to resolve all the conflicts between them.
The Contact Committee's reciprocity provision' 57 may also have im-

151. It is also questionable whether state anti-takeover statutes actually achieve the
stated goals for which they are promulgated. Often, target management will use the state
legislative defenses to remain in power, but, as a result of the battle for corporate control
and after all the costs associated therewith, management will take the same type of actions it publicly fears from the hostile bidder, i.e., loading the company with debt, restructuring, and laying off employees.

152. See Macey, State Anti-Takeover Legislation and the National Economy, 1988
Wis. L. REV. 467; see also Note, Sword or Shield: The Impact of Third-Generation
State Takeover Statutes on Shareholder Wealth, 57 GEO. L. REV. 958 (1989).
153. Proposal, supra note 5, art. 21, at 14. The Contact Committee was officially
created by Council Directive of 5 March 1979 CoordinatingSecurities to Official Stock
Exchange Listing (7912791EEC), 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 66) 21 (1979).
154. Proposal, supra note 5, art. 21(1)(a), at 14.
155. Id. art. 21(1)(b), at 14.
156. Id. art. 21(3), at 14.
157. Id.
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portant implications for United States corporations wishing to commence
a tender offer in the Community. This provision implicitly recognizes
the right of a Member State to impose reciprocity requirements on bidders from outside the Community. 58 The extent of such provisions is as
yet uncertain but could loom large for United States bidders.
The United States often provides a less than cordial reception toward
foreign bidders. For example, the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act of 1988159 provides that certain acquisitions by foreign persons may
be subject to special regulation and perhaps prohibition if they pose a
threat to national security. According to the proposed regulations, the
term "national security" should be interpreted broadly."' 0 In addition,
foreign bidders have at times discontinued their offers for United States
companies because they find the imposed reporting requirements unacceptable. For example, the Banca Commerciale Italiana, S.p.A. desisted
in its offer for Irving Bank in part because of its fear of prospective
disclosure requirements.161
Protectionist measures in the United States do not go unnoticed. Reciprocity provisions enacted by the European supervisory authorities could
become problematic for United States corporations attempting to make
tender offers in Europe." 2 Under these circumstances, a United States

158. Id. art. 21(1)(b), at 14.
159. Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5021, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988). For the proposed rules,
see Regulations Pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers by Foreign Persons,
54 Fed. Reg. 29,744-755 (1989) [hereinafter Exon-Florio Amendment]. For a brief analysis of this section, known as the Exon-Florio Amendment, see, D.E. BIRENBAUM & C.
THORNTON, FEDERAL REGULATIONS OF FOREIGN ACQUISITIONS OF U.S. COMPANIES:

AN ANALYSIS OF THE ExoN-FLoRIo AMENDMENT (1989); Bello &

Holmer, Exon-

Florio Regs Give President Authority to Block Takeovers, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 28, 1989, at
22, col. 2.
160. Exon-Florio Amendment, supra note 159, at 29,746; see also, Eizenstat & Fullerton, Crying Wolf on Takeovers, Nat'l L.J. July 24, 1989, at 13, col. 1.
161. See Letter from W. Wiles, Secretary of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, to Patricia S. Skigen & John B. Cairns (discussing prospective requirements in regard to the acquisition of Irving Bank) (Aug. 19, 1988) (available from author). There has even been some attempt to extend the Williams Act to tender offers
occurring entirely in Europe. In September 1989 Senator Alan Dixon voiced his concerns
over the Securities and Exchange Commission's refusal to interfere in the foreign B.A.T.
Industries takeover battle. He thus placed the August 9, 1989, letter of Representative
Dan Rostenkowski into the Congressional Record. This letter questioned "whether the
use of U.S. assets of a foreign target as the principal source of funds for repayment of the
acquisition debt would constitute a sufficient diversion from corporate purposes to require the imposition of U.S. income tax on any built-in gains in such assets." 135 CONG.
REC. S10,838, S10,839 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1989).
162. See supra notes 39, 40, and accompanying text.
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corporation might need to form a subsidiary in Europe or otherwise establish a European presence to avoid potentially onerous reciprocal enactments. Likely targets for such acquisitions may be found in Italy,
where numerous markets, such as insurance, are less competitive and
sophisticated than in the other major Member States.1 13 Spain may also
present possibilities for such investment, though with obstacles that need
be overcome.1 6 4 And though an investment in these states may evoke
fears of language difficulties, it also presents a beckoning opportunity.
III.

CONCLUSION

The Proposal is of interest to United States business people and lawyers for two reasons. First, the Proposal presents bold solutions to abuses
existing in the United States tender offer process. The Proposal circumscribes much of the action that now takes place on the United States
battlefield of hostile tender offers. Tender offers would be subject to
more complete regulation and less likely to be coercive of shareholders.
The Proposal would probably eradicate two-tiered tender offers. The defensive options of target management, including "abusive" tactics, would
also be curtailed to a great extent during the offer's pendency.
Those seeking legislative reform on the United States field can seek
inspiration from the European approach. Heightened regulation does
not, however, always result in greater benefit to shareholders, if indeed
the Proposal still considers the benefit of shareholders to be the primary
concern of management. The Proposal's comparatively more burdensome
regulatory requirements will discourage even tender offers that are advantageous to shareholders. It is questionable whether this type of intrusive regulation would presently be acceptable, at least on the 'federal
level, in the United States. The recent developments in state law and the
proliferation of legislative proposals on the federal level, however, may
be indicative of a general trend toward more substantial regulation in
this area. Moreover, there is a pronounced movement in state law away
from the promotion of shareholders' rights. Accordingly, the United
States legislative climate may be warming to the type of regulatory obstacles presented by the Proposal.
Second and more important, the Proposal is significant to practitioners
163. See Glisenti & Rabb, Italy: Land of New Opportunity, FORBES, Nov. 22, 1982,
at 75; Lane, Impatientfor Change, THE BANKER, May 1989, at 21(1); Takeover Frenzy
Jolts EC Insurance Industry, J. Corn., Nov. 28, 1989, § A, at 1, col. 2.
164. See BUSINESS AMERICA, May 25, 1987, at 19 (prepared by officials of the
United States Consulate General in Barcelona); Schreiber, Nonresidents' Investment
Rights: The Spanish Experience Recent Reforms, 22 INT'L LAW. 207 (1988).
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advising United States companies that wish to enter the European market. By providing a federal, preponderantly uniform regulation of tender
offers, the Proposal would facilitate to some extent United States mergers and acquisitions in Europe on a Community-wide basis even though
it does create several procedural difficulties. The Proposal would appear
to favor hostile bidders once they succeed in launching a tender offer, as
the Proposal's greater impact may be its prohibition of many target defensive tactics. The prohibitions of article 8 may so hinder target management that hostile bidders will benefit even if supervisory authorities
exercise their discretion in favor of the target. Moreover, the Contact
Committee may effectively remove the spectre of potential supervisory
authority abuse. Given this advantage to bidders, the Proposal may provide an impetus for United States companies to achieve a secure niche
within post-1992 Europe. On the other hand, if the supervisory authorities begin to enact the European equivalent to state anti-takeover statutes
and also troublesome reciprocity provisions, the playing field would be
open in name only to a United States bidder. Fears of this nature, however, are as of yet merely speculative.
At present, the Single European Market presents a tremendous opportunity to United States companies prepared to meet its challenges and
take advantage of its benefits. The longer United States companies wait
to accomplish these goals, however, the less attractive their prospects will
be.
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APPENDIX

COMMISSION

Proposal for a Thirteenth Council Directive on Company Law
Concerning Takeover and Other'General Bids
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES;

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, and in particular Article 54 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission,
In cooperation with the European Parliament,
Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee,
Whereas it is necessary to coordinate certain safeguards which Member
States require of companies and firms within the meaning of the second
paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty for the protection of members and
others, in order to make such safeguards equivalent throughout the
Community;
Whereas it is necessary to protect the interests of the shareholders of
public companies limited by shares when these are the subject of a takeover or other general bid;
Whereas shareholders who are in the same position should be treated
equally;
Whereas this equality of treatment requires that the obligation to make a
bid is imposed on persons wishing to attain a certain level of participation in a company and in order to ensure the protection of minority
shareholders and to avoid purely speculative partial bids, it is necessary
to require that these persons make a bid for all the shares of that
company;
Whereas each Member State should designate a supervisory authority or
authorities to ensure that parties to a takeover or other general bid fulfill
their obligations; and whereas it is necessary to determine which authority has territorial jurisdiction in the case of cross-frontier bids and to
provide for the mutual recognition of offer documents within the Community; whereas the different authorities must cooperate with one another and their present or former officers and servants should be bound
to preserve confidentiality;
Whereas to reduce the scope of insider dealing offerers should be required to announce their intention of launching a bid as soon as possible
and to inform the supervisory authority and the offeree company's board
of the precise terms of the bid before they are made public;
Whereas to avoid operations which frustrate the bid it is necessary to
limit the powers of the board of directors of the offeree company to en-
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gage in operations of an exceptional nature;
Whereas to help ensure compliance with the obligations resulting from
the Directive it should be compulsory for offerers to be represented by a
person or credit institution licensed to deal on the financial markets;
Whereas the addressees of a takeover or other general bid should be
properly informed of the terms of the bid by means of an offer document
and, where the consideration offered includes securities, should be provided with certain additional information about the company issuing
those securities;
Whereas the offerer should be required to bring the offer document to
the attention of all addressees of the bid and where the offer document
contains insufficient information to clarify the real intentions of the
offerer, the supervisory authority should be able either to forbid the publication of the offer document or to make the offerer publish a revised
document;
Whereas it is necessary to set a time limit for takeover bids;
Whereas, in the interests of the offeree company and the addressees *of
the bid, it should be provided that once an offer document has been made
public the bid may not be withdrawn except in certain specified
circumstances;
Whereas the board of the offeree company should be required to report
in writing to its shareholders its view of the bid, and whereas where the
consideration offered in the bid includes securities for which at the time
the bid is made no official stock exchange listing has been applied for it
should also be required to obtain and make available to all addressees of
the bid an additional report by an independent expert;
Whereas offerers are entitled to revise their bids; whereas limits should
be placed on the right in order to maintain an orderly market in the
shares and it should be ensured that the addressees of the bid are informed in time; whereas it is necessary that the offerer draw up and
make public a fresh document setting out the amendments to the original
bid and whereas addressees who have already accepted the bid should be
entitled to accept the revised bid;
Whereas in order to ensure equal treatment of addressees of the bid, any
acquisition by the offerer, or by certain persons associated with him, of
shares which are the subject of the bid at a higher price than that laid
down in the offer document or one of its revisions, must itself be considered as a revision;
Whereas to be able to perform their functions satisfactorily, supervisory
authorities need to be able to find out at any time how many acceptances
have been received to date and whereas, from the time the intention to
make a bid is announced by the offerer, any dealing in the securities
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concerned must be made public by any person already having a significant shareholding;
Whereas the result of the bid must be made public and notified to the
supervisory authority;
Whereas taking into account the social policy of the Community, it is
necessary that representatives of the employees of the offeree company be
informed with regard to the bid and that they should receive all the documents concerning that bid;
Whereas competing bids for the securities of a company are necessarily
to the advantage of its shareholders; whereas all such bids should be
subject to the same rules as the original bid and the original offerer
should be entitled to withdraw his bid in such a case;
Whereas this Directive does not until subsequent coordination affect the
capacity of Member States to forbid a takeover or other general bid
where the offerer is either a national or a company from a third country,
in particular where Community nationals and companies do not benefit
from reciprocal treatment as regards the acquisition of shares by means
of such a bid in a company governed by the law of that third country;
HAS ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE:

Article 1
Scope
The coordination measures prescribed by this Directive shall apply to
the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States
relating to takeover and other general bids addressed, on the same terms,
to all holders of the securities, or the securities of a particular class or
classes, of any of the following types of company:
- in Germany:
die Aktiengesellschaft, die Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien,
- in Belgium:
la soci&6 anonyme/de naamloze vennootschap, la societ6 en commandite par actions/de commanditaire venootschap op aandelen,
- in Denmark:
aktieselskaber, kommanditaktieselskaber,
- in Spain:
la sociedad an6nima, la sociedad en comandita por acciones,
- in France:
la socit6 anonyme, la socit6 en commandite par actions,
- in Greece:
27aVWVu)V/71 cratpea, 776empoTppvPAK
"Ara e ratpdl,
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- in Ireland:

the public company, limited by shares,
- Italy:

la societA per azioni, la societa' in accomandita per azioni,
- in Luxembourg:

in societ6 anonyme, la socit6 en commandite par actions,
- in the Netherlands:

de naamloze vennootschap,
- in Portugal:

sociedade an6nima, sociedade em comandita por acres,
- in the United Kingdom:

the public company, limited by shares.

Article 2

Definitions
1. For the purposes of this Directive, 'offeree company' shall mean a
company whose securities are the subject of takeover or other general
bid (hereinafter referred to as 'a bid').
2. For the purposes of this Directive, 'offerer' shall mean any person or
company including, where appropriate, the directors of the offeree
company, who launches a bid in accordance with the obligation set
out in Article 4 or on a voluntary basis.
3. For the purposes of this Directive, 'securities' shall mean securities
carrying voting rights in a company or which can be converted into
securities carrying such rights.
4. For the purpose of this Directive, 'parties to the bid' shall mean the
offerer, the representative of the offerer within the meaning of Article
9, the directors of the offerer, if the latter is a company, the addressees of the bid and the directors of the offeree company.
5. For the purpose of this Directive, 'persons acting in concert' shall
mean persons who, pursuant to an agreement, cooperate with one another with the aim of acquiring the securities of a company.
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Article 3
Equal treatment
Shareholders who are in the same position shall be treated equally.
Article 4
Obligation to make a bid
1. Any person aiming to acquire a number or percentage of securities,
which, added to any existing holdings, gives him a percentage of the
voting rights in a company which may not be fixed at more than 33
V3%, shall be obliged to make a bid to acquire all the securities of that
company.
2. To calculate the threshold referred to in paragraph 1, the following
must be added to the voting rights held by the offerer:
(a) voting rights held by persons acting in their own name but on behalf of the offerer;
(b) where appropriate, voting rights held by companies belonging with
the offerer to the same group of undertakings within the meaning
of Article 1 of Council Directive 83/349/EEC';
(c) voting rights held by persons acting in concert with the offerer;
(d) where appropriate, voting rights held by directors of the offerer
company.
3. The supervisory authority may grant exemptions to the rule laid
down in paragraph 1, giving reasons for its decision and adopting all
measures necessary to ensure equal treatment of all shareholders.
Article 5
Exemptions on the basis of size of the offeree company
Article 4 shall not apply:
.(a) Where the securities of the offeree company have not been admitted to official stock exchange listing or have not been the subject of
a request for such admission at the moment when the bid is announced in accordance with Article 7, and
(b) Where the offeree company, or, where appropriate, the group of
undertakings with the meaning of Article 1 of Directive 83/349/
1. OJ No L 193, 18. 7. 1983, p. 1.
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EEC to which the company belongs, do not exceed, at the balancesheet date, the amounts of two of the three criteria laid down in
Article 27 of Council Directive 78/660/EEC. 2
Article 6
Supervisory authority
1. Member States shall designate the authority or authorities which
must discharge the functions specified in this Directive. The authorities thus designated may delegate all or part of their powers to other
authorities or to associations or private bodies. Member States shall
inform the Commission of these designations and of any delegation of
powers and shall specify all divisions of functions that may be made.
2. The authorities and, where appropriate, the associations or private
bodies referred to in paragraph 1 must have all the necessary powers
to ensure that this Directive is put into effect and, in any case, either
the power to forbid the publication of an offer document which is
incomplete by reference to the requirements of this Directive or the
power to oblige the offerer to correct an inadequate offer document
and to make it public by the means set out in Article 11(1).
3. The authority competent for supervising the drawing-up and publication of the offer document shall be that of the Member State in which
the offeree company has its registered office. Where the bid is made
in several Member States simultaneously, the offer document as prepared under the supervision of the national authority responsible
shall be accepted in the other Member States, without their supervisory authorities having the right to require the inclusion of any additional particulars in the document.
4. After an offer document has been made public in accordance with
Article 11(1), the competent authorities of the Member States shall
give each other any cooperation required for the performance of their
duties and for this purpose shall supply each other with any information that may be necessary.
5. All present or former officers or servants of supervisory authorities
shall be bound by the rules of professional secrecy. Information that
has come to their knowledge in the course of performing their professional duties shall not be disclosed to any person or body not legally
entitled to receive it.
6. This Directive shall not affect the legislation of Member States con-

2.

OJ No L 222, 14. 8. 1978, p. 11.

960

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol, 22:923

cerning the liability of competent authorities.
Article 7
Procedure prior to publication of the offer document
1. As soon as it decides to make a bid, the offerer shall make public its
intention of doing so by one of the means provided for in Article
11(1). It shall inform the competent supervisory authority
accordingly.
2. The offerer shall then immediately draw up an offer document in
accordance with Article 10 and make it public in accordance with
Article 11 (1).
3. Before the offer document is made public, the offerer shall communicate it to the competent supervisory authority and to the board of the
offeree company.
Article 8
Restriction of the powers of the board of the offeree company
After receiving the information referred to in Article 7(1) and until the
expiry of the period for accepting the bid, the board of the offeree company shall not, without the authorization of the general meeting of
shareholders, decide:
(a) to issue securities carrying voting rights or which may be converted
into such securities;
(b) to engage in transactions which do not have the character of current
operations concluded under normal conditions unless the competent
supervisory authority has authorized them, giving its reason for such
authorization.
Article 9
Representative of the offerer
The offerer shall be represented either by a qualified person authorized
to deal on the Community financial markets or by a credit institution
authorized within the Community.
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Article 10
Offer document
1. The offerer shall draw up an offer document in respect of the bid
stating at least:
(a) the type, name and registered office of the offeree company;
(b) the name and address of the offerer or, where the offerer is a company, the type, name and registered office of that company;
(c) the name and address or, where appropriate, name and registered
office of the representative of the offerer referred to in Article 9;
(d) the securities or class or classes of securities for which the bid is
made;
(e) the securities, or the securities of the relevant class or classes, already
held by:
(aa) the offerer,
(bb) other persons for the account of the offerer,
(cc) companies belonging with the offerer to the same group of undertakings within the meaning of Article 1 of Directive 83/349/EEC,
(dd) persons acting in concert with the offerer,
(ee) where the offerer is a company, its directors, and the voting rights
attached to those securities and the date and the price at which they
acquired;
(f) where the offerer is a company, the securities, or the securities of a
particular class or classes, of the offerer held by the offeree company,
and voting rights attached to them and the date and the price at
which they were acquired;
(g) the consideration offered for each security and the basis of the valuation used in determining it and, in the case of a cash consideration,
the guarantees provided by the offerer regarding payment of that
consideration, and, where appropriate, a statement concerning any
future indebtedness of the offeree company to finance the bid;
(h) where the consideration comprises securities, the date from which
those securities will entitle their holders to a share in the profits and
any special conditions affecting that entitlement;
(i) any condition authorized by the competent supervisory authority
which the offerer places on the bid;
(j) the latest date on which the bid may be accepted;
(k) the steps to be taken by the addressees of the bid in order to signify
their acceptance and to receive the consideration for the securities
which they transfer to the offerer;
(1) the intentions of the offerer, explicitly expressed, regarding the con-
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tinuation of the business of the offeree company, including the use of
its assets, the composition of its board and its employees;
(m) any special advantages which the offerer intends to grant to the directors of the offeree company;
(n) all agreements concerning the exercise of the voting rights attached
to the securities of the offeree company.
2. In addition, the offer document shall identify:
(a) any person for whose account the offerer is acting;
(b) any companies belonging with the offerer to the same group of undertakings within the meaning of Article 1 of Directive 83/349/
EEC;
(c) any person acting in concert with the offerer.
3. Where the consideration offered includes newly-issued securities for
which at the time of the bid an official stock exchange listing has been
applied for, the offer document shall be accompanied by the listing
particulars required by Council Directive 80/390/EEC.s
4. Where the consideration offered includes securities for which at the
time of the bid no official stock exchange listing has been applied for,
the offer document shall contain all the facts necessary to enable the
addressees of the bid to form an informed judgment as to the assets
and liabilities, financial position, record and prospects of the issuer.
Article 11
Publication of the offer document
1. The offer document and, where appropriate, the documents required
by Article 10(3) or (4) shall be either:
(a) published in full in one or more national or mass circulation newspapers and in the national gazette designated under Article 3(4) of
Council Directive 68/151/EEC, 4 or
(b) made available to the addressees of the bid at addresses announced
in notices in the newspapers and the gazette referred to at (a) or by
equivalent means approved by the competent supervisory authority,
or;
(c) where all the securities comprised in the bid are registered, circulated
to all addressees of the bid.
2. The offer document, and where appropriate, the documents referred
to in Article 10(3) and (4) shall also be filed with the competent su3. OJ No L 100, 17. 4. 1980, p. 1.
4. QJ No L 65, 14. 3. 1968, p. 8.
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pervisory authority.
Article 12
Period for acceptance
1. The period for accepting the bid indicated in the offer document in
accordance with Article 10(1)(j) may not be less than four weeks or
more than ten weeks from the date of publication of the document in
accordance with Article 11(1).
2. The period may not be modified without the authorization of the
supervisory authority, giving its reasons, without prejudice to Article
20.
Article 13
Withdrawal of bids
1. Once a bid has been made public by the means provided for in Article
11(1), it may be withdrawn only in the following circumstances:
(a) where there are competing bids and the offerer decides to withdraw
his bid in accordance with Article 20(4);
(b) in a bid in which new securities are offered in exchange for the
securities bid for, where the approval of the general meeting of the
offerer company is not obtained for the issue of the new securities;
(c) in a bid in which securities are offered in exchange for the securities
bid for, where the securities fail to obtain an official stock exchange
listing as the offerer intended;
(d) where the necessary judicial or administrative authorization is not
obtained for the acquisition of the securities for which the bid 'is
made, and in particular in the event of lack of authorization of the
acquisition by the merger control authorities;
(e) where a condition of the bid announced in the offer document in
accordance with Article 10(1)(i) and approved by the competent supervisory authority is not fulfilled;
(f) in exceptional circumstances and with the authorization of the supervisory authority, giving reasons, where the bid cannot be put into
effect for reasons beyond the control of the parties to the bid.
2. The withdrawal of the bid shall be made public by the means provided for in Article 11(l) and communicated to the competent supervisory authority.
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Article 14
Report of board of offeree company
1. The board of the offeree company shall draw up a detailed report
giving its views on the bid and setting out the arguments for and
against acceptance. The report shall state whether the board is in
agreement with the offerer on the bid and specify any agreements on
the exercise of the voting rights attached to the securities of the offeree company.
2. Where the consideration offered comprises securities for which at the
time of the bid no official stock exchange listing has been applied for,
the board's report shall be accompanied by the report of an expert
independent of the parties to the bid appointed or approved by the
competent supervisory authority. This report shall in all cases state
whether, in the expert's opinion, the consideration offered is fair and
reasonable and shall give the expert's views on the basis of valuation
used to determine the consideration.
3. The reports shall, in good time before the expiry of the period for
acceptance, be made public by the means provided for in Article 11(1)
and filed with the competent supervisory authority.
4. Where the board of the offeree company is in agreement with the
offerer, the board's report, accompanied, where appropriate, by the
expert's report as referred to in paragraph 2, may be attached to the
offer document provided for in Article 10.
5. The provisions of this Article shall also apply to revisions of the bid
and to competing bids.
Article 15
Revision of bids
1. At any time before the last week of the period for acceptance announced in accordance with Article 10(1)(j), the offerer may revise
the terms of the bid. Article 7(1) shall apply as regards the public
announcement of the offer's intention to revise the bid.
2. Where a bid is revised, the previous period for acceptance shall be
automatically extended by one week.
3. The offerer shall draw up a document setting out the amendments to
the offer document and making it public by the means provided for in
Article 11(1).
4. Member States shall ensure that persons who have already accepted
the previous bid by the offerer may accept the revised bid.
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5. The periods provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 may be modified
with the authorization of the competent supervisory authority, which
must set out the reasons on which it is based.
Article 16
Automatic revision
The acquisition of the officer, by persons acting in concert with him or
by persons acting in their own name but on behalf of the offerer, during
the acceptance period, of securities in respect of which the bid is made at
a price higher than that established in the offer document or one of its
revisions, will itself be considered as a revision of the bid and have the
effect of increasing the consideration offered to those who have accepted
previously.
Article 17
Provision of information to the supervisory authority
1. Throughout the period for acceptance of the bid the offerer shall provide the competent supervisory authority at any time on request with
information as to the number of acceptances received to date.
2. From the time a bid is publicly announced in accordance with Article
7(1), the offerer or any holder of 1% or more of the voting rights of
the offeree company, of the offerer company if the offerer is a company, or of any other company whose securities are offered by way of
consideration, shall declare to the competent supervisory authority all
acquisitions of securities of the said companies by the offerer or the
holder, persons acting in concert with them or persons acting in their
own name but for their account, and the purchase price of such
securities.
Article 18
Publication of result of bid
Once the period for acceptance has expired, the result of the bid shall be
made public by the means provided for in Article 11(1) and shall be
communicated to the competent supervisory authority by the offerer.
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Article 19
Information for representatives of employees of the target company
The board of the offeree company shall communicate to its workers' representatives, as designated by national legislation or customary practice
in Member States, the offer document and, where appropriate, the documents referred to in Article 10(3) and (4), as well as its own report as
referred to in Article 14 and, if appropriate, the expert's report as referred to in Article 14(2).
Article 20
Competing bids
1. Where competing bids are made for the securities of the offeree company, this Directive shall apply to each such bid.
2. Competing bids shall be publicly announced in accordance with Article 7(1). The offerer shall draw up an offer document in accordance
with Article 10 and shall make it public by the means provided for in
Article 11(1) before the period for acceptance of the initial bid
expires.
3. Except with the authorization of the competent supervisory authority,
which must set out the reasons on which it is based, persons acting in
concert with the offerer or acting in their own name but for the account of the offerer may not make a bid competing with the initial
bid.
4. Where there are competing bids and the initial offerer does not withdraw its bid, the period for acceptance of the initial bid shall be extended automatically to the date of expiry of the period of acceptance
of* the competing bid. The extension shall be made public by the
means provided for in Article 11(1) and communicated to the competent supervisory authority.
Article 21
Contact committee
1. A contact committee shall be set up under the auspices of the Commission. Its function shall be:
(a) without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 169 and 170 of the
Treaty, to facilitate the uniform application of this Directive through
regular consultations on, in particular, practical problems arising in
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its implementation;
(b) to ensure concerted action upon the policies followed by the Member
States in order to obtain reciprocal treatment for Community nationals and companies as regards the acquisition of securities of a company by means of a takeover bid;
(c) to advise the Commission, if necessary, on additions or amendments
to this Directive.
2. The contact committee shall be composed of representatives of the
Member States and representatives of the Commission. The chairman
shall be a representative of the Commission. Secretarial services shall
be provided by the Commission.
3. The committee shall be convened by the chairman either on his own
initiative or at the request of one of its members.
Article 22
Transposition of the Directive
1. Member States shall adopt before . . . the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive. They
shall forthwith inform the Commission thereof.
2. Member States shall fix the date of entry into force of these provisions in any case at the latest by . . ..
3. Member States shall communicate to the Commission the texts of the
main provisions of national law which they adopt in the field covered
by this Directive.
Article 23
Addressees of the Directive
This Directive is addressed to the Member States.

